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the southern invaders suffered major
top. For Brezhnev himself Angola be-
ficers lauded the Cubans for their brav-
setbacks. Pretoria then decided to with-
came a benchmark for “active solidar-
ery and for their ability to function as a
draw towards the border, partly because
ity with the peoples of Africa and Asia”
link between Moscow and Luanda
of its military problems and partly be-
and evidence that the Soviet Union
while at the same time “respecting” the
cause the U.S. Senate voted on Decem-
could advance socialism in the Third
paramount role of the CPSU leadership.
ber 19 to block all funding for covert
World during a period of detente with
The overall Cuban-Soviet relationship
operations in Angola. Pretoria would
the United States.53
improved significantly in the wake of
not accept being left in the lurch by
What did the Soviets believe they
the Angolan operation, up to a point
Washington, with its own men held hos-
learned from the Angolan conflict?
which had not been reached since the
tage to a conflict they no longer believed
From the reports coming in to the CPSU
1962 missile crisis.56
they could win.50
CC International Department, the most
Moscow and Havana also agreed
Just as it had opened the gates for
important lesson at the time seems to
on strategy in Angola after the main
African acceptance of Soviet-Cuban aid
have been that the United States could
battles had ended in the spring of 1976.
to the MPLA, the by now defunct South
be defeated in local conflicts under cer-
Both countries wanted to wind down
African intervention also paved the way
tain circumstances. First, the Soviet
their military involvement as soon as
for African diplomatic recognition of
armed forces must be capable of and
possible, “avoid broad military clashes
the new Angolan regime. By mid-Feb-
ready to provide, at short notice, the
with South Africa, and attain their goal
ruary 1976, most African states had of-
logistics for the operation needed.
by means of political and diplomatic
ficially recognized Neto’s government,
These tasks were primarily assigned to
struggle.” In May, Raul Castro told the
as had the Organization of African
the navy and the air-force, both of which
Soviet General Staff that he wanted to
Unity (OAU), in spite of attempts by
were commended for their efforts in
start withdrawing Cuban troops right
its chairman, Ugandan President Idi
Angola. Second, the Soviet Union must
away, and that he expected almost
Amin, to have the decision postponed.
be able to organize and control the anti-
15,000 Cubans to have left by late Oc-
Soviet diplomatic efforts contributed
imperialist forces involved (unlike in
tober. The Cuban leaders asked Mos-
significantly to this development, for
Vietnam, where the Soviet leaders felt
cow to inform Pretoria of their inten-
28 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
tions, well knowing that such a demili-
Propaganda Department.60
Angolan foreign policy in the future,”
tarization of the conflict—albeit with a
The transformation of the MPLA
Raúl Castro told his Soviet colleagues.
MPLA government in place—was what
turned out to be an infinitely more dif-
He instructed Risquet to “on all ques-
the Soviets had wanted all along. Ha-
ficult task for the Soviets than the dis-
tions inform the USSR embassy in
vana knew how to placate the great
semination of Lenin busts. Neto’s in-
Angola and maintain close contact with
power, although, as we will see below,
dependence of mind and his claim to
the Soviet comrades.” Castro also cas-
they exacted their price for doing so.57
be a Marxist theoretician in his own
tigated some of the Angolan leaders
The second lesson the Soviets be-
right rankled the Russians and made it
whom the Soviet distrusted; Lucio Lara
lieved they had learnt from the Angolan
increasingly difficult for them to con-
“displays a certain restraint on questions
adventure was that the Soviet Union can
trol the MPLA as soon as the military
[of] broadening the collaboration with
and must rebuild and reform local anti-
situation stabilized. Some of the
the socialist countries. He is reserved
capitalist groups in crisis areas. The
Angolan leaders whom Moscow dis-
and not frank . . . . [and] has avoided
MPLA, local Soviet observers postu-
liked, for instance FAPLA veteran com-
us,” Castro told Ponomarenko.63
lated in 1976, was saved from its own
mander and defense minister Iko
But even such measures could not
follies by advice and assistance from
Carreira and MPLA general secretary
always convince the Soviets of Cuban
Moscow, which not only helped it win
Lucio Lara, who was strongly influ-
loyalty. Reporting on Neto’s visit to
the war, but also laid the foundation for
enced by the European left, strength-
Havana in July 1976, the Soviet em-
the building of a “vanguard party.” The
ened their positions after the war was
bassy noted with disapproval that Fidel
Angolan movement had earlier been
over. According to the embassy, the
Castro had told the Angolans that Cu-
plagued by “careerists and fellow-trav-
influence of such people delayed both
ban troops would remain in Africa “as
ellers,” but, due to Soviet guidance, the
the necessary changes in the MPLA and
long as they are needed,” and that Neto
“internationalists” were in ascendance.
the finalization of the development
had asked for Cuba’s assistance in
These new leaders—men like Lopo do
plans on which the Soviets and Cubans
building a Marxist-Leninist party. Even
Nascimento and Nito Alves—under-
were advising.61
worse, Castro had spoken of Angola,
stood that the MPLA was part of an in-
Differences between the Soviet and
Cuba, and Vietnam as “the main anti-
ternational revolutionary movement led
Cuban perceptions of the political situ-
imperialist core” of the world. That the
by Moscow and that they therefore both
ation in the MPLA did not make things
Cuban president had also mentioned the
then and in the future depended on So-
easier for Moscow. Part of the price
“central role” of the Soviet Union was
viet support.58
which Castro exacted for his general
not sufficient to please the Soviet ob-
It was these “internationalists” who
deference to the Soviets on the Angolan
servers, particularly since Castro
Moscow wanted to assist in building a
issue was the right to argue for Angolan
coupled his statement with an endorse-
new MPLA, patterned on the experi-
political solutions which were to his lik-
ment of Neto’s own “paramount role”
ence of the CPSU. Noting the poor state
ing. Preeminent in Castro’s political
in the MPLA.64
of the MPLA organization in many ar-
equation was the leadership of
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