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exactly at that time. sions. 7
Malenkov: Today I admit that I essentially took a Besides this concern about the Yugoslavs as a factor in
wrong position on the German question. the future, Khrushchev evoked memories of World War II,
so important for the vast majority of the people in the
Most remarkably, the Plenum transcript confirms that audience: he indignantly reminded them that the Yugoslav
two leaders of the ruling triumvirate, and not only Beria, communists were the only force that fought the Nazis right
proposed to renounce the slogan of  socialist Germany. until 1944, only to be rewarded with excommunication
This could hardly be  a confession of the kind elicited by from the communist camp in 1948.8
torture and terror in Stalin s times, although Malenkov Although Khrushchev had won the power game
must have been filled with dread when placed in the same against Molotov even before the plenum began, it was not
category with  the spy and traitor Beria, who wanted, enough. The man had been a member of Lenin s Secre-
according to the verdicts of the July 1953 plenum, to sell tariat and Politburo, the second most respected and visible
the GDR to the imperialists. Hence, his lame explanation politician in the Soviet Union for at least two decades
that his support of Beria s proposal was dictated only by therefore it was necessary to destroy his political authority
tactical expediency. [Ed. Note: After all, Malenkov would in the eyes of the elite gathering. The Khrushchev group
be the first top leader to be demoted in a non-fatal manner. was prepared to do it by all means, including ideological
But there was no way to know of this distinction in polemics. Their goal was to prove that Molotov became
advance.] hopelessly dogmatic and lost touch with the  ever-
evolving and live ideology of Marxism-Leninism. But
After just six months of relative peace, infighting the old party horse Molotov was unusually well prepared
within the Presidium spilt over again onto the plenum for this kind of battle and delivered a broadside of Lenin
floor. Khrushchev s growing annoyance with Molotov s quotations.
seniority and the fact that Molotov was the permanent In the political discussion about Titoism, Molotov also
critic of Khrushchev s foreign and domestic initiatives led held strong cards. His main thesis was about the political
to frictions in February-April 1955 over the conclusion of danger of the Yugoslav version of  nationally-oriented
30 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10
socialism for the Soviet empire in the past and the future. However, the following arguments followed in defense
He made it clear that Stalin s reaction against Tito was not of the given explanation of the reasons for the rupture:
a costly mistake, as Khrushchev maintained, but an that if we did not say that the main reason was Beriia s
absolutely rational preemptive measure against the and Abakumov s intrigues, then the responsibility for the
growing threat of nationalist deviations in the communist rupture would fall on Stalin, and that was
camp, led by the Soviet Union.  Nationalist vacillations impermissable.
took place in other communist parties. For instance, in These arguments should not be accepted.
Poland Gomulko (sic), then the First Secretary of the Khrushchev. On Stalin and Molotov.
Polish United Workers Party. It is easy for all of us to Molotov. That s new.
understand how dangerous and negative such a nationalist Khrushchev. Why is it new?
deviation [uklon] can be, if it contaminated the leadership Molotov. We signed the letter on behalf of the party
of the Polish United Workers Party. As we know, the CC.
Polish population is one and a half times as large as Khrushchev. Without asking the CC...11
Yugoslavia s population. One should keep in mind other Molotov. Com. Khrushchev is speaking imprecisely
countries as well. 9 [netochno].
Ultimately the most effective weapon of Khrushchev Khrushchev. I want once again to repeat: I was not
against Molotov proved to be neither ideological, nor asked, although I [was] a member of the Politburo.
political theses, but something else. First, he made
revelations of Molotov s  errors in the past and thereby Only eight months later, in February 1956 Khrushchev
demystified his aura as a world statesman. If Stalin s aura attacked Stalin for his mistakes and crimes, but then he
had to be damaged in the process, so much the better. At spared Molotov. [Ed. note: For Khrushchev s second
one point, irked by the cold logic of Molotov s presenta- secret speech given in Warsaw in March 1956, see below
tion on the dangers of Yugoslav-style national-commu- in this Bulletin section.] De-Stalinization was a turning
nism, Khrushchev burst out: point in the history of international communism and the
Soviet Union itself. Yet, plenums did not play any
Khrushchev: Viacheslav Mikhailovich, if you, as noticeable role in this revolutionary development.
minister of foreign affairs, analyzed a whole series of Khrushchev chose a larger forum, the party congress, to
our steps, [you would see that] we mobilized people deliver his speech against Stalin. Growing reaction to
against us. We started the Korean War. And what does Khrushchev s political radicalism and growing ambitions
this mean? Everyone knows this. reflected itself, for a time, in heated discussions within the
[Anastas] Mikoian. Aside from our people, in our CC Presidium which, with the exception of the debates on
country. the 1956 Polish and Hungarian crises, are still hidden from
Khrushchev. Here, Viacheslav Mikhailovich, this must historians eyes. [Ed. Note: For  Malin notes on 1956
be borne in mind; everything must be understood, Presidium meetings regarding Poland and Hungary, see
everything analyzed, [and] only then can one come to CWIHP Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 96-97)]
the correct conclusion. We started the war. Now we Khrushchev s rivals correctly feared that his combina-
cannot in any way disentangle ourselves. For two years tion of populist style, control over the KGB, military
there has been no war. Who needed the war?...10 support from Marshal Georgii Zhukov, and the pivotal
position as head of the party machinery would soon reduce
This exchange appeared in the final version of the all adversaries. Materials from the June 1957 plenum
stenographic report distributed among the party elite, but published in the Russian journal Istoricheskii archiv
the passage about  who started the Korean War disap- [Historical Archive] in 1993-94, offer a remarkable insight [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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