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his report to the IAEA, Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, who had just been
awarded a Nobel prize, urged Iran to:
& respond positively and without delay to the Agency s remaining questions
related to uranium enrichment, and to the additional transparency measures
we have requested. As I have stated before, these transparency measures are
indispensable for the Agency to be able to clarify remaining outstanding is-
sues  in particular, the scope and chronology of Iran s centrifuge enrichment
programs. Clarification of these issues is overdue after three years of intensive
verification efforts.133
Following the IAEA meeting Russian moved much closer to Iran by signing a one
billion dollar arms deal with it, which included $700 million for surface-to-air
missiles that could be deployed to protect Iran s nuclear installations.134 Such an
air defense system, once installed, could seriously inhibit a possible US or Israeli
attack. By moving to help Iran to protect its nuclear installations, Moscow sent a
clear signal that it would stand by Iran, whatever its nuclear policies.
In the aftermath of the Russian arms deal, which clearly strengthened Iran s
position, and, as noted above, appeared to reinforce the Russian commitment to
Iran, Iran prepared for renewed talks with the EU3. Prior to the meeting, however,
Ahmadinezhad once again made a highly provocative statement, especially
for the Europeans, by asserting that the Holocaust was a  myth. Not only the
Europeans but also Moscow repudiated the Ahmadinezhad statement.135 To what
degree the Iranian president s comments on the Holocaust negatively influenced
Iran s negotiations with the EU3 is an open question. However, it is clear that
Iran s announcement that it would enrich additional uranium in mid-January 2006
effectively ended the talks, and the EU3, drawing increasingly close to the United
States, called on the Security Council to take action against Iran.136
As tensions between Iran and NATO rose, the IAEA met in early February
2006, and, noting Iran s unwillingness to provide inspectors with the necessary
information about its nuclear program, voted 27 to 3 (with 5 abstentions) to
refer Iran to the UN Security Council in March if Tehran failed to  restore the
international community s confidence in its nuclear program. 137 While Russia
voted for the resolution, the additional month before referral to the Security Council
was aimed at giving Moscow time to win Iran over to its plan to enrich Iranian
uranium in Russia. Meanwhile, Putin, seeking to build up Russia s technological
base, and perhaps also to persuade Iran that it was not being singled out for special
Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 145
treatment by the Russian proposal, announced a program to make Russia a world
center for uranium enrichment.138
While Russia was seeking to entice Iran to agree to its nuclear enrichment plan,
Iran was taking a hard line. In response to the IAEA decision to refer Tehran to the
UN Security Council, Ahmadinezhad ordered industrial level nuclear enrichment,
halted surprise visits by the IAEA to its nuclear installations and ordered the
IAEA to remove seals and surveillance equipment on some of the Iranian nuclear
facilities.139
In this chilly atmosphere, Russian Iranian talks began in mid-February. Putin
himself noted on 22 February that  the talks are not going easily ,140 but expressed
optimism that they would be successful. Unfortunately, Putin s optimism proved
unfounded as the talks collapsed in early March, primarily because Iran continued
to demand the right to enrich uranium domestically.141 The failure of the talks
placed Iran in further diplomatic isolation, and perhaps for this reason Iran tried
once again to negotiate with the EU3. These negotiations, however, like the
previous ones, failed again because Iran refused to stop enriching uranium.142
Under these circumstances, it appeared that following the March meeting the
UN Security Council would take up Iran s nuclear program. While ElBaradei s
report to the IAEA did not state conclusively that Iran was pursuing a nuclear
weapons program, he did state,  Regrettably, however, after three years of intensive
verification, there remain uncertainties with regard to both the scope and the nature
of Iran s nuclear program & For confidence to be built in the peaceful nature of
Iran s program, Iran should do its utmost to provide maximum transparency and
build confidence. 143
As the time for UN Security Council deliberations on Iran neared, Foreign
Minister Lavrov floated the idea of letting Iran do a limited amount of nuclear
enrichment domestically while the bulk of the enrichment would be done in Russia.
While this idea appeared to have the endorsement of IAEA Chief ElBaradei, US
opposition killed it.144
As the issue began to be discussed in the UN Security Council, Iran, seeing
itself in deepening international isolation, tried yet another ploy. This was to offer
to engage the United States in talks on the rapidly deteriorating security situation
in Iraq.145 It is possible that, by demonstrating flexibility in this area, Iran hoped it
could delay action against it in the Security Council, and give Russia diplomatic
ammunition to use to postpone any sanctions.
Meanwhile, Russia reverted to its traditional policy of being willing to publicly
criticize Iran for its actions, but also being unwilling to support serious action
against Tehran. Thus on the eve of the UN Security Council debate, Lavrov was
sharply critical of Iranian behavior during its talks with Russia:  We are extremely
disappointed with Tehran s conduct during these talks. Iran is absolutely failing
to help those [parties] who are seeking peaceful ways to resolve this problem.
Contradictory signals are coming from Tehran. One day they reject it, the next
day they don t. 146
Despite the criticism, Russia took a strong stand against the possible imposition
of sanctions against Iran during the Security Council talks. The end result was
146 R.O. Freedman
a non-binding resolution which, while frequently expressing  serious concern
about Iran s actions, such as its resumption of nuclear enrichment activities,
did not contain any threats of sanctions and only asked for ElBaradei to report
back on Iranian compliance in thirty days.147 Indeed, in a follow-up meeting in
Berlin, Lavrov reiterated the Russian position, stating that sanctions could not
be used  to solve the Iranian nuclear dispute, and asserting that the IAEA had
yet to provide  decisive evidence that Iran was developing nuclear weapons
programs.148
So matters stood until the surprise announcement by Ahmadinezhad, on the
eve of a visit by ElBaradei to Iran to ascertain Iran s compliance with the Security
Council resolution, that Iran had succeeded in enriching uranium, and  joined the
club of nuclear countries, by putting into successful operation a cascade of 164
centrifuges.149 While this number was insufficient to provide enough enriched
uranium for a nuclear weapon, Iran s Atomic Energy Organization s Deputy
Director, Mohamed Saeedi said that within a year the number of centrifuges in
operation would be 3000  in the opinion of most observers, enough for a nuclear
weapon, if the centrifuges were competently managed  and in the future Iran would
bring 54,000 centrifuges on line.150 Iran also contemptuously rejected ElBaradei s
call for Iran to stop its enrichment efforts, with Ahmadinezhad asserting that
Iran would not retreat  one iota on nuclear enrichment, and Iran s chief nuclear
negotiator, Ali Larijani, asserting that the UN Security Council proposals were [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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